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Introduction 
Informal Finance in Rural Niger: 
Scope, Magnitudes and Organization 
by 
Douglas H. Graham 
Nelson Aguilera 
Michel Keita 
Kif le Negash 
Rural finance in Niger is a little explored area. This is 
even more true for informal financial markets. This paper 
attempts to redress this state of affairs by documenting key 
informal financial activity in the country. This documentation 
is derived from three separate field surveys carried out in Niger 
in 1985 and 1986 by a team of researchers under the direction of 
Ohio State University and the Institut de Recherches en Sciences 
Humaines of Niger. {l) The first section of this paper draws 
upon the findings of these field surveys and presents an overview 
of formal and informal financial services in rural Niger. The 
next section explores the network of merchant finance in the 
countryside. This data clarifies the separate roles and 
magnitudes of wholesale and retail finance. This is followed by 
a detailed review of tontines and moneykeepers, the classic forms 
of indigenous financial intermediation at the village level. The 
final section summarizes the strengths and limitations of formal 
and informal finance in rural Niger and draws conclusions 
concerning the prospects for building down from formal structures 
or building up from an informal base. 
Table 1 sets forth the relative importance of formal and 
informal borrowing activity in Niger. A random sample of 398 
village households from 22 villages throughout Niger highlights 
the overwhelming importance of informal credit activity in the 
country. Twenty two percent had average annual access to formal 
credit over the period 1980-85 (this drops to fifteen percent if 
we exclude simple small sized seed loans). Roughly 84 percent of 
the households had an average annual access to informal borrowing 
over this same five year period. The percentages add up to more 
than 100 percent since some households had access to both formal 
and informal credit. 
The formal credit activity is associated with an expected 
loan amount of only 3,565 CFA whereas informal borrowing genera-
ted an expected loan value seven and one half times higher. 
Total borrowing activity represented approximately nineteen 
percent of the agricultural income recorded in the sample 
households in 1985 with informal credit sources predominating. 
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Table 2 moves beyond the random sample results to present a 
more comprehensive profile of formal and informal savings and 
loan activity in Niger. The results are derived from separate 
surveys of wholesale and retail merchants, tontines and money-
keepers as well as the random sample profile, and data on loans 
from the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA) and savings 
deposits held in rural post office branches in Niger. The loans 
or savings are listed in rank order within each category in the 
table. Columns 1 or 2 underscore the sharp difference in scale 
between wholesaler loans and those at the village level. If one 
excludes wholesaler activity and focuses on village level loans, 
one can see these range in size from 64 to 144 dollar equivalent 
loans from informal sources and from 3 to 345 dollars from formal 
sources. This range of loan activity is cons,istent with a rural 
income per capita in 1985 documented at 65 dollars per person. 
The informal savings activity through tontines and moneykeepers 
range from 19 to 205 dollars per member, per tontine or per 
deposit. This compares to an average post office savings deposit 
of 51 dollars in 1985. 
Several important findings are evident in this profile of 
financial market activity at the village level. First, there are 
diverse forms and channels of financial activity in rural Niger. 
Second, the average size of informal loans and savings are equal 
to or larger than formal savings and loan activity. Third, 
mcneykeepers, a peculiarly African phenomenon, stands out in both 
loan and savings channels. Fourth in terms of sheer size and 
magnitude merchant finance predominates in this setting. The 
remainder of this paper investigates in more detail the mag-
nitudes, patterns, and characteristics of the merchant network 
and tontine and moneykeeper organizations in rural Niger. 
Following this discussion the implications for institutional 
development of rural finance are explored. 
Merchant Finance i_D Rural Niger 
Table 3 documents the range and pattern of wholesale and 
retail finance in rural Niger while Tables 4 to 7 test several 
hypotheses concerning the borrowing and lending activity of the 
two class of merchants. These data on merchants come from a 
follow-up survey in 1986 of 38 wholesalers (Grossistes) and 58 
retail merchants (detaillants) identified through our random 
sample survey of 398 village households carried out in 22 
villages in 1985. We consider these data on 38 wholesalers and 
56 retailers to be a reasonable sample of ''commercant" activity. 
The merchants were randomly chosen from a list of merchants 
identified by the villagers. 
Wholesalers live in nearby regional towns while retailers 
live in the villages and participate actively in village life. 
The panel data in Table 3 highlights the profile of this merchant 
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finance network. Both merchant classes have high access to 
credit supplies (panel 1). For wholesalers this credit comes 
largely from banks while for retailers it comes from other 
merchants and suppliers, namely, wholesalers (panel 2). The form 
of credit to wholesalers is money (as one would expect from 
merchants drawing heavily on bank credit) while credit in kind 
(i.e. goods) dominates the supply of credit to retailers (panel 
3), as one would expect in a goods -consignment wholesaler-
retail network. Household items dominate the type of goods sold 
for both merchant groups (panel 4). Agricultural inputs 
represent a minor to non-existent type of good dealt with through 
merchant finance in Niger. Two factors explain this feature. 
First, modern inputs are not widely used in traditional village 
agriculture. Second, to the extent modern inputs are used in 
donor-supported IRD projects or periodic fertilizer programs, 
governme~t parastatal monopolies control the distribution of 
these inputs. 
Panels 5 through 11 in Table 3 round out this profile of 
merchant finance. A high percentage of the merchants (who had 
benefited from access to finance) in turn make loans to others 
(panels 5 and 6). This underscores the chain of finance or 
trickle down effect evident in the network of merchant finance in 
rural Niger. Of interest here is the link between formal and 
informal finance as the bank financed wholesalers pass on their 
increased liquidity in the form of goods consignments (i.e. 
credit in kind) to their network of village based retailers who 
in turn make loans to villagers. 
Panels 8 and 9 identify another important feature of 
merchant finance in rural Niger, the role of indeterminant lines 
of credit. Wholesalers can actually arrange for long term credit 
(more than one year) as can be seen in panel 8, however, this is 
not common (or necessary) for retailers. What is of interest 
here, however, is the relative importance of indeterminant lines 
of credit, especially for the village level retailers both as 
borrowers and lenders (panels 8 and 9). Roughly forty percent of 
their credit activity falls into this category. 
Indeterminant lines of credit imply an open line of credit 
of indeterminant length or term structure. This form of credit 
transaction rarely occurs with formal or institutional credit. In 
informal finance, however, where the lender - client relationship 
is more close knit, monitoring and risk management can occur at 
low transaction costs, and the possibilities for negotiating 
flexible and changing terms of loan contracts are more common. 
It should be pointed that neither wholesalers or retailers 
admitted to charging interest. This should not be necessarily 
interpreted as truly reflecting no interest charges. In a Muslim 
society traders would not easily admit to such a practice, at 
least not to an interviewer from the outside. Also it is 
possible that interest could be charged implicity through the 
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pricing of goods with their clientele. We were not in a position 
to trace out these transactions over time to see if implicit 
interest did enter the downstream pricing relationships. 
Finally panels 10 and 11 of Table 3 highlight the greater 
relative participation of retail merchants in tontines and 
moneykeeper activity. This of course is consistent with their 
being village residents. 
Tables 4 through 7 complete the profile of merchant finance 
for the 38 wholesalers and 56 retailers in our sample. Here we 
test the relationship between the most recently recorded average 
loan size (as a borrower or as a lender) and selected charac-
teristics of the loan (such as term structure and collateral) and 
of the merchant. Ordinary least squares regressions were used to 
test these relationships. The t-ratios and their relative 
statistical significance are reported in each table. 
The results are more revealing for retailers than for 
wholesalers. For the latter Table 4 only indicates there was not 
a statistically significant relationship between average loan 
size for wholesalers as borrowers and collateral, term structure 
or average loan size as a lender. The lack of any positive 
association between recorded collateral and loan size (which one 
would expect) probably grows out of the weak quality of the 
answers given by wholesalers concerning the value of their liquid 
assets and inventory (i.e. their collateral). 
Table 5 does indicate a positive and statistically signi-
ficant relationship between the wholesalers loan size as a 
lender, on the one hand, and the term structure of their loan 
obligations to their creditors on the other hand. This relatio-
nship makes sense. Longer term credit from one's creditors would 
likely allow one to engage in larger sized loan activity. 
The most interesting and consistent findings, however, can 
be found for village level retailers (Tables 6 and 7). Here the 
level of collateral and term structure of the loan are both 
significantly associated with the average loan size of retail 
borrowers. Also the term structure of the retailers' loan (as a 
lender) is significantly associated with their average loan size 
as a lender. These findings for informal, village level, mer-
chants (especially retailers) are consistent with the financial 
behavior one would expect from business oriented financial 
intermediaries. It is logical that collateral would play a role 
in determining average loan size. Similarly it is understandable 
that larger average sized loans would be associated with a longer 
term structure as a borrower or a lender. It is now instructive 
to investigate the financial profile of other village level 
intermediaries. 
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Tontines are the most popular village Jeve1 i11stltution 
mobilizing deposits and dispensing loans in Niger. The OSU 
survey randomly chose 56 tontine organizers or leaders from a 
list prepared from the earlier village household survey respon-
dants who identified the tontine organizers known to them in 
their village. The final sample generated a min~mum of two 
tontine leaders from each of the randomly selected 22 villages in 
Niger. A third tontine organizer was chosen from the larger 
sized villages to reach the total sample of 56 tontine 
organizers. 
Table 8 sets forth the key descriptive characteristics of 
the sample. Tontines in rural Niger range from small groups of 
three to four members to large groups of forty members. As in 
any informal rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) each 
member contributes a fixed amount during each meeting throughout 
the life of the tontine (i.e. the period of time it takes for 
every member to benefit from the loan generated through the 
aggregate contributions of all other members). In our sample, 
tontines met once every five, seven, fourteen, twenty one, or 
every 30 days (panel E). The life cycle of the tontine (Panel F) 
can be established by multiplying the number of members by the 
frequency of meetings. A loan is granted during each meeting 
from the collected contributions of each member. Each member of 
course continues his contribution at each meeting even after 
receiving his loan. In our sample female organizers predomin-
ated. This represented a range of female occupations from 
housewives to female market vendors to public school teachers and 
female extension agents. Male organizers were either farmers or 
traders. 
There did not appear to be any established practice to pay a 
premium to move up in the queue to gain an earlier rather than a 
later loan in the lifecycle of the tontine. On the contrary 
organizers emphasized that the loan rank order was collectively 
determinated at each meeting according to the relative needs of 
each member. This is not surprising in a Sahelian village 
society where income and food sharing practices are fairly 
common. By the same token the agreed upon sequential order of 
loans was frequently changed in the face of emergency needs of 
another member. 
This resource sharing practice in villages and flexibility 
in catering to member needs within these tontines should not 
blind us to the wide diversity of income levels and the amount of 
liquidity circulation in Niger village level tontines. Panel B 
of Table 8 establishes this wide diversity through strikingly 
different relative magnitudes of average member contributions and 
the average size of tontine loans. Average member contributions 
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can range from a low of 100 CFA (i.e. about 25 cents) in the 
lowest income tontine to a high of 25,000 CFA in the highest 
income totine (roughly 70 dollars). Individual tontine loans 
(i.e. the contribution per member times the number of members) 
range from 800 CFA (little more than two dollars) in the lowest 
income level tontine to 200,000 CFA (i.e. roughly 700 dollars) in 
the highest income tontine. The average loan size for all 56 
tontines was 104 dollars, comparable to the average outstanding 
balance of CNCA formal loans (111 dollars) in 1985. 
It is instructive to investigate the degree to which tontine 
characteristics are significantly associated with these diverse 
tontine income levels evident in panel B. Ordinary least squares 
regression estimates are set forth in Table 9 identifying tontine 
characteristics that explain the wide diversity in monthly 
contributions per member, per tontine. The contributions are 
inversely related to the organizer being a housewife and posi-
tively related to the organizer being a trader or public sector 
employee (School teacher, extension agent, etc.), being paid a 
fee for carrying out the responsabilities of organizer, and being 
located in the high income region of Maradi. These results are 
consistent with our expectations that higher income tontines 
would be significantly associated with higher income occupations 
of the organizer since tontine memebership tends to follow 
segmented occupational groupings. Similarly one would expect 
that only higher income tontines would be able or interested in 
paying the organizer a fee for his or her services to manage the 
tontine. 
To appreciate the unusual scale of total savings and loan 
activity for the 56 tontines one can estimate the total liquidity 
circulation by calculating the total contribution for the entire 
life cycle of each tontine (which can range from one month to as 
much as one year, see Panel F). These can then be aggregated 
into a grand total for all 56 tontines. This grand total amounts 
to the CFA equivalent of 72,000 dollars for an average life cycle 
well under one year in length. This represents an unusually 
promising potential base for a more formally based village 
cooperative to build on. 
Moneykeeper activity completes this profile of village level 
financial services. As in the tontine survey, a list of money-
keepers was compiled from respondents in our earlier village 
household survey. Moneykeepers were randomly chosen from this 
list in the 22 villages with two moneykeepers drawn from each 
village and a third added to the larger sized villages to reach 
56. Table 10 indicates a heavy representation of Haoussa 
moneykeepers in the sample throughout the country. In contrast 
to tontines, the male gender predominates for moneykeepers in our 
sample. Similar to tontines there is a wide diversity in the 
number and amount of deposit activity. Seventeen moneykeepers 
(out of 56) recorded no deposit activity in the previous season. 
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Of the remaining 39 moneykeepers there is a wide diversity from 
one to 150 depositors and from 10,000 CFA (a bit less than 30 
dollars) to as much as 5,000,000 CFA in deposits (a little over 
13,000 dollars) at the height of the season, namely the immediate 
post harvest period. 
Moneykeepers are among the most respected members of the 
village as one would expect with so many people entrusting their 
money to their care. Frequently their depository services are 
also associated with pawnbroking services and the storage of 
other goods for limited periods of time. Traders predominate 
among the occupation of moneykeepers. As traders they are 
frequently entrusted with money to use to buy goods (in nearby 
Nigeria for example) for their customers. Hence the holding of 
deposits can also be associated with a down payment for future 
goods acquisition. Moneykeepers do not pay interest on their 
deposits, nor do they appear to charge for their security 
services. Possibilities exist for implicit interest to be 
charged in associated commercial transactions, but we were unable 
to trace out these transactions over time. 
Table 11, through an ordinary least squares regression, 
explores further the important characteristics explaining the 
size of the deposit public served by a moneykeeper at the height 
of the season. Literacy is not associated with the number of 
depositors served, indeed, a significantly inverse relationship 
is discovered here. The same holds for the simultaneous supply 
of pawnbroker services. These features are significantly 
associated with moneykeepers with a smaller number of depositors. 
On the other hand, years of service as a moneykeeper is posi-
tively associated in a significant fashion with serving a larger 
base of depositors, as one might expect. Also traders are 
significantly associated with a larger deposit public, compared 
to other occupational groups. This is consistent with our 
expectations along with the finding that Zinder stands out as the 
region with the larger deposit base. The villagers in this 
region, close to Nigerian border, frequently use the moneykeeper-
traders as a commercial conduct for cross border trade. 
Moneykeepers are also important sources of informal loans in 
their villages. Panel E of Table 10 highlights this role. Here 
the short term nature of the loan activity stands out among the 
moneykeepers with loans who answered the question on term 
structure. As indicated earlier in Table 2 the average loan size 
for the 44 moneykeepers with loan activity was 54,784 CFA 
(roughly 144 dollars). This was larger than the tontine loan 
size average, the CNCA average outstanding balance or the average 
retail merchant loan to villagers. It is also interesting to 
note that the term structure of deposits held by moneykeepers is 
considerably longer (Panel F, Table 11) than the term structure 
for their informal loans (in panel E). 
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Finally it is relevant to point out the importance of the 
aggregate level of deposits held by the 39 moneykeepers with 
active deposit accounts in our sample. This came to roughly 30 
million CFA (or 79,000 dollars) during the height of the season 
and approximately 13 million CFA (or $34,000 dollars) during the 
dry season. This seasonal variation in moneykeeper deposits 
reflects the changing number of depositors in that 617 active 
depositors were recorded during the height of the season and only 
363 during the low level dry season. Whether during the harvest 
or dry season this flow of deposit activity through the 39 active 
moneykeepers in our sample represents significant liquidity 
circulation. In conjuction with our earlier findings on tontines 
this informal village level deposit base illustrates an addi-
tional potential source of liquidity for more formal financial 
intermediaries. 
Summary and Conclusions: Implications for Development Finance 
We have addressed the scope, magnitudes and organization of 
key informal financial markets in Niger in this paper. In the 
rudimentary economies of Sahelian Africa these markets play a 
more dominant role, particularly at the village level, than in 
many low-income countries. Yet despite the low incomes as-
sociated with Niger, it was clear that there was a substantial 
flow of liquidity through these markets. Also, despite the 
rudimentary nature of these markets an embryonic form of f inan-
cial intermediation was occurring through tontines, moneykeepers 
and merchants. In short, the scope was wide, the magnitudes 
substantial and the organization rational and consistent with 
business oriented financial parameters of performance. Finally, 
one must not overlook the important fact that these informal 
vehicles supplying village level financial services have proven 
to be self-sustaining in the risky environment of the Sahel. 
What are the lessons for formal finance in the documented 
record of informal finance in rural Niger? First it is important 
to recognize the nature of the financial services being demanded 
and supplied at the local level. There is an ample demand for 
short term credit, deposit and savings services and consumption 
loans in this setting. Second, open lines of credit of indeter-
minant length and frequently changing terms and conditions mark 
the organizational style of financial transactions of this level. 
Third, multiple rather than single service finance dominates with 
the act of saving and the granting of loans intimately linked in 
tontine and moneykeepers activities. Pawnbroking, inventory and 
marketing services are also tied into the activities of money-
keepers and retail lenders. Finally, both explicit and implicit 
elements of enforcement exist at the local level in the form of 
collateral substitutes (e.g. deposits for a moneykeeper, etc.) 
frequent contact, social cohesion and sanctions. In short, 
interlinked markets, multiple services and a theory of contracts 
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interlinked markets, multiple services and a theory of contracts 
shape the transactions taking place in the financial markets of 
rural Niger. 
Formal finance, however, has a difficult time emulating 
these features of informal finance and thereby maintaining a 
viable presence in local markets. They generally fail to 
appreciate the strength of the indigenous systems or recognize 
the nature of the demand for financial services at the local 
level. No interlinked market or multiple services characterize 
the activity of the public sector agricultural development bank 
(i.e. the CNCA). The CNCA in Niger ignores deposit services 
entirely and emphasizes medium to long term loans. There is a 
strong bias against any form of decentralization or local 
autonomy in loan demand. Top-down loan targeting predominates. 
Only infrequent contact is established with the final borrower 
with several layers of intervening bureaucracy. There is no 
interest in mobilizing local resources (with or without outside 
funds). Instead outside funds displace potential local sources 
of funding for the institutions, thereby creating an alien, 
institution with no local identification. Not surprisingly, 
there is little social cohesion felt or local social sanctions 
exercised on behalf of loan recovery and financial solvency for 
the public sector institutions by the local populace. 
It is difficult for formal financial institutions to emulate 
the virtues of informal finance. At the same time it is difficult 
for informal finance to emulate the scale and alleged spatial 
economies of formal finance. Nevertheless a bottom-up approach 
may be the more promising path to follow in the future. Informal 
markets, despite their strengths and flexibility, are still 
fragmented into relatively homogeneous tontine groupings or 
limited by small moneykeeper deposit bases. The advantages of 
broader scale and scope economies are unrealized along with the 
advantages of pooling a larger base of short term deposits into a 
slightly longer term structure of loans. These pooling and 
transformation properties are difficult to create through small 
scale, informal financial mechanisms. Finally, it is difficult 
in informal finance to diversify risk through spatial economies 
(i.e. an interregional network) that smooths out inter-annual and 
intra-annual seasonal cash flows in a broad national market. 
The discussion above leads us to a set of questions that are 
useful statements with which to end this paper. 
1. What are the comparative costs of promoting formal institu-
tions to mimic the strengths of informal finance versus the 
promotion of informal financial groups to adopt features of 
formal finance? 
2. Is it politically and administratively feasible to expect 
that public sector development banks in Africa could ever 
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decentralize operations into relatively autonomous local 
branches with diversified untargeted loan portfolios, built 
largely upon local deposit mobilization? 
3. What economic initiatives are necessary to induce village 
level moneykeepers, retail merchants and tontine leaders to 
consider joint action to build up from their current 
informal vehicles into a more formalized cooperative 
venture? 
4. How can one develop a flexible formalization of informal 
groups in an Integrated Rural Development enclave when all 
the signals and organizational style of the IRD project have 
been built upon a heavily targeted, top-down approach? 
5. How is it possible for a formal financial institution to 
survive in a legal setting where land titles and other 
property are too poorly developed to use as collateral in 
financial contracts? (Informal finance can remain viable 
through collateral substitutes, formal finance cannot). 
The key question here is the degree to which some village 
based set of credit and savings cooperatives, building on retail 
merchants, moneykeepers and tontine leadership in Niger, could 
"build up" more successfully that the formal institutions to date 
have been able to "build down". These issues should be the 
subject of future research on rural financial markets in Africa. 
Source of 
Loans 
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Table 1 
Total Formal and Informal Borrowing Recorded at the Village 
Household Level in Niger in the Summer of 1985 
(From Random Sample of 398 Households) 
Expected Borrowf nT % of Agric. 
Access to Ave. Amount (col 1 x col 2) 2 Income 
Loans (%) (inCFA)(l) of H.H. 
CFA (% of Total) 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Formal 22.4 15,916 3,565 12 2.2 
2. Informal 83.9 31, 757 26,651 88 16.7 
Total 30,213 100 18.9 
Source: Results of Random Sample of 398 Village Households reported in 
Chapter III (C) of Rural Finance in Niger: A Critical Appraisal and 
Recommendations for Change, Final Report of The Ohio State University 
to the USAID Mission, Niamey, Niger, February 1987. 
Notes: (1) Average exchange rate in 1985: one dollar equaled 380 CFA. 
(2) The "expected borrowing" refers to the size of a formal or 
informal loan that a random household would expect to have 
access to in our random sample. This is the probability of 
gaining access to a formal or informal loan (column 1) times 
the average loan size documented in the survey (column 2). 
I. 
II. 
III. 
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Table 2 
Selected Indicators Summarizing Savings and Loan Activity in 
Rural Niger Derived from Rural Finance Project Surveys, 1985-86 
U.S. $ Equiv. Subsample 
(380 CFA Total With Savings 
CFA = 1 USi} SamRle or Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formal Loans 
1. Average size CNCA 131.049 $ 345 n.a. 238 
equipment loan in 
village household 
survey 
2. Ave. size of balance of 42,300 111 n.a. n.a. 
outstanding individual 
loans in CNCA, 1984-85 
3. Ave. size of CNCA seed loan 995 3 n.a. 215 
in 1985 village household 
survey 
Semi-Formal Loans 
1. Ave. loan size to 19,246,642 50,649 38 28 
wholesale merchants 
Informal Loans 
1. Ave. wholesale merchant 2,327,500 6,125 38 16 
loan size to others 
2. Ave. loan size to 399,564 1,051 58 31 
village retail merchants 
3. Ave. moneykeeper loan 54,784 144 56 44 
size to villagers 
4. Ave. size of rural 39,342 103 56 56 
village tontine loan 
5. Ave. size of informal 31,757 84 898 398 
loan in 1985 village 
household survey 
(random sample subset) 
6. Ave. si~e retail merchant 24,280 64 50 29 
money loan to villagers 
(Continued) 
IV. 
v. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Selected Indicators Summarizing Savings and Loan Activity in 
Rural Niger Derived from Rural Finance Project Surveys, 1985-86 
U.S. Equiv. Subsample 
(380 CFA Total With Savings 
CFA 1 US$ Sample or Loans 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) 
Formal Savings 
1. Ave. size of deposit in 19,200 $ 51 n.a. n.a. 
Post Office Savings Inst. 
(1984) {Countrywide) 
Informal Savings 
1. Ave. savings contribu- 77,782 205 56 56 
ti on per month per 
ton tine 
2. Ave. level of deposits 48,744 128 56 39 
held with village money-
keeper (at immediate 
post harvest season) 
3. Ave. level of deposits 35,507 93 56 39 
held with village money-
keeper (during dry 
season) 
4. Ave. savings contribu- 7,071 19 56 56 
tion per month, per member 
per tontine 
Source: OSU Rural Finance Project Surveys in Niger, 1985-6. Reported in Chapters 
III and IV of Rural Finance in Niger, op. cit. 
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Table 3 
Comparative Profile of Business Activity for 38 Wholesale and 
58 Retail Merchants Operating in Selected Areas of Rural Niger 
from Selected Data in Rural Finance Project Survey, May 1986. 
Wholesale 
Merchants 
Retail 
Merchants 
1. Percent of Total No. 
with access to loans (%) 
2. Source of Credit (%) 
a) friends and relatives 
b) other merchants 
c) banks 
d) suppliers 
e) others 
3. Form of Credit (%) 
a) in money 
b) in goods 
c) both 
4. Type of Products Sold (%) 
a) cereals 
b) household items 
c) livestock products 
d) combination above 
5. Percent of total making 
loans to others 
a) in money 
b) in goods 
c) both 
6. Percent With Access to Loans 
Making Loans to Others (%) 
(continued) 
(1) 
86.8% 
9.1 
24.2 
48.5 
12.1 
6.1 
51.5 
27.3 
21.2 
13.2 
71.1 
10.5 
5.2 
94.7 
(23.7) 
(52.6) 
(18.4) 
64.0 
(2) 
60.3% 
14.3 
57.1 
5.7 
20.0 
2.9 
22.9 
65.7 
11.4 
3.6 
60.7 
3.6 
32.1 
87.0 
(16.0) 
(31.0) 
(40.0) 
88.6 
7. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Comparative Profile of Business Activity for 38 Wholesale and 
58 Retail Merchants Serving Selected Areas of Rural Nige1· 
from Selected Data .in Rural Finance Project Survey, May 1986. 
Average Level of Liquid Assets and 
Value of Stock of merchandise (CFA) 
Wholesale 
Merchants 
(1) 
3,863,017 
Retail 
Merchants 
(2) 
132,441 
8. Term Structure as Borrower (% Total) 
a) 0-30 days 
b) 31 - 365 days 
c) more than one year 
d) indeterminate line of credit 
18.2 
39.4 
21.2 
21.2 
34.3 
25.7 
0.0 
40.0 
9. Term Structure as Lender (% Total) 
10. 
11. 
Source: 
a) 0-30 days 
b) 31 days to a year 
c) indeterminate line of credit 
Percent in Tontines (%) 
Percent in Moneykeeper Role (%) 
24.1 
13.8 
62.1 
5.3 
15.8 
46.9 
9.4 
43.7 
22.4 
37.9 
OSU Rural Finance Project Surveys in Niger, 1985-6. Reported in 
Chapter III-D in Rural Finance in Niger, op. cit. 
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Table 4 
Relevant Borrower Characteristics Tested by Ordinary least Squurcs 
Estimates from Sample of 38 Wholesalers in Niger Village Surveys, 1988 
Dependent Variable: Average Loan Size as Borrower (CFA) 
Estimated 
Variable 
~-··- -····----·~---·- C o.~:fll.91-en! t-ratio 
Wholesaler's collatr~ral -12.4 (-1.05) 
Term-structure (Rorrower) ··13140.5 (. (). 55) 
Average loan size as lender 2.9 ( 1.70) 
Intercept 41282528.9 
HSQ = 0.50 
* Sjgnificant at 5 percent level. The above results arc derived from the 
following equation (Y = B'X + u); Where Y =the independent variable, 
R' = the vector of parameters, X = the vector of explanatory variables with 
the first term equal to one (the intercept) and u is the error term. 
Table 5 
Relevant Lender Characteristics Tested by Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimates from Sample of 38 Wholesalers in Niger Village Surveys, 1986 
Dependent Variahlc: Average Loan Size as Lender (CFA) 
Term-structure (Lender) 
Term-structure (Borrower) 
Intercept 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
-·---···--·------
24013.0 
9300.3 
-3810508.1 
t-ratio 
------
0.49) 
2.27)* 
RSQ 0.47 
* Sjgnifjcant at 5 percent level. For equation specificaUon see note 
table 4. 
Son ref!: OSU Rund Fii1iu1c1~ Project Surveys in Nif~Pr, 1985-BG. Rc!portcd in 
Chapter· ITT D in Rural Fina11c!?. _tn _N_i_giu:. op. cit. 
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Tabln 6 
Relevant Borrower Characteristics Tested by Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimates from Sample of 58 Retailers in Niger Vj J lat!e Surv<~ys, 1986 
Dependent: Varfoble: Average Loan Size as Borrower (CPA) 
Variable 
.. -.. ·----~·--... --~ ..... ~·-·· 
Retailer's collateral 
Term-structure (Borrower) 
Average loan size as lender 
Relatives 
Traders 
Suppliers 
Banks 
Intercept 
Estimated 
.~oE;fficient 
0.8 
4044.0 
-1. 7 
-407333.6 
-37248.0 
52046.7 
-58232.7 
34223.3 
t: -rat: j o 
,_ ~~----~ .. -·-~-
( 2.02)* 
( 2.95)* 
(-0.41) 
(-0.HO) 
( --0. 04) 
( 0.18) 
( -0. 14) 
HSQ 0.27 
* Significant at 5 percent level. For equation specification see note 
table 4. 
Table 7 
Relevant Lender Characteristics Tested by Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimates from Sample of 58 Retailers in Niger VilJage Surveys, 1986 
Dependeut Variable: Average Loan Size as Lender (CFA) 
Term-structure (Lender) 
Term-structure (Borrower) 
Purchasing crops 
Moneykeeper activities 
Tontine activities 
Intercept 
Estimated 
C(),£.fficj en! 
508.9 
--13. 3 
1932.7 
9496.6 
--561.9 
-8655 .1 
( 2.41)* 
(. 0. 28) 
( 0.20) 
( I . 05) 
(-0.05) 
RSQ"' 0.14 
------
*Significant at 5 percent level. For equation specification see note 
table 4. 
Source: OSU Rural Finance Project Surveys in Niger, 1985-86. Reported in 
Chapter III-D in R!!t<.!..L...E!.!!~!lC~_!.!LNi_g_~,r.. op. cit. 
1. Hausa 
2. Zarma 
3. Peulh 
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Table 8 
Selected Characteristics of the Sample of 
56 Tontines in the Niger Village Level Surveys, 1986 
No. 
30 
14 
8 
A. Ethnic Groups 
_%_ 
53.5 
25.0 
14.3 
4. Toureg 
5. Beriberi 
TOTAL 
No. 
3 
_1_ 
56 
% 
5.4 
1.8 
100.0 
B. §ize of Ave. Contribution and Size of Single Loan (In Discrete Groupin~l 
Per Member Contributions No. Size of Single Loan Per Tontine No. 
1. 100 to 300 CFA 11 1. 800 to 3,400 CFA 8 
2. 500 CFA 12 2. 5,000 to 9,500 CFA 10 
3. 1,000 to 2,500 CFA 13 3. 10,000 to 17,000 CFA 10 
4. 3,000 to 5,000 CPA 5 4. 20,000 to 55,000 CPA 11 
5. 10,000 CFA 11 5. 60,000 to 90,000 CFA 10 
6. 15,000 to 25,000 
__! 6. 100,000 to 200,000 CPA _J_ 
TOTAL 56 TOTAL 56 
c. Gender of Membershi~ 
No. _%_ Nq..:... -~ 
1. All women 32 57.1 3. Majority men 5 8.9 
2. Majority women 18 32.1 4. All men _1_ 1.8 
TOTAL 56 100.0 
D. No. Members per Tontine 
No. % 
1. 3 to 10 members 22 39.3 
2. 11 to 19 members 19 33.9 
3. 20 to 40 members 15 26.8 
TOTAL 56 100.0 
E. Frequency of Contributions 
No. % No. % 
1. Every 5 days 3 5.5 4. Every 14 days 1 1.8 
2. Every 7 days 32 57.1 5. Every 30 days 19 33.9 
3. Every 10 days 1 1.8 TOTAL 56 100.0 
F. Complete Life Cycle of Tontine 
No. -~-- No...:... % 
·--··-
1. 33 to 60 days 5 8.9 4. 241 to 300 days 8 14.3 
2. 61 to 120 days 17 :rn." 5. 300 to 360 days 4 __ -1~-~ 
3. 121 lo 240 days 22 39.3 TOTAi. 56 100.0 
Source: OSU Rural Finance Project Tontlne Survey, 1986, Reported in 
Chapter IV- C in RuraL!':J nance in Niger., op. cit. 
• 
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Table 9 
Rrdevant Tontine Characteristics Tr~sted by Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimates from Sample of f'iG To11tines in Niger Vi 1 ]age S11rV!'V, 1985 
---------------------·---·-·--
Jlependent Variable: Monthly contribution per member per tontine (CFA) 
Variable 
---··--
1. Lifecycle 
2. Payment for services 
Housewives 
Traders 
Public Sector Employees 
Niamey 
Doddo 
Mara di 
Zinder 
5. Intercept 
Estimated 
g_9.f:.f1Js:ient 1 
- 2.13 
2 .16 
--2947 .4 
4048.2 
2349.9 
755.8 
- 757.0 
3576.7 
-1525.6 
6884.9 
t·-ratio 
---~.-·~· ... ·--
( - . 60) 
( :'!.5J)* 
5.07)** 
2.89)* 
:'L49)** 
(-1.17) 
( --
.79) 
( 4.60)** 
(-1.87) 
RSQ 0.67 
*Significant at 5 percent level; **significant at 1% level. For equatio11 
specification see note table 4. 
Source: OSU Rural Finance Project Tontine Survey, 1986. Reported in 
Chapter rv-c in g!,!raL.fJnance_J..[l __ ~j_g_~r_. op. cit. 
Note (1) Coefficients are Ridge HegressJon Coe?fficicnts fork O.U. 
1. 
2. 
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Table 10 
Selected Characteristics of Moneykeepers from the Sample 
of 56 Moneykeepers in the Rural Finance Project Survey, 1986 
A. Ethnic Groups 
No. _%_ No. 
Haoussa 32 57.1 3. Peulhg 6 
Zar111a 13 23.2 4. Touareg J 
TOTAL 56 
% 
10.7 
1.0 
100.0 
B. No. Depositors and Amount of Deposits at Harvest Season (Discrete Groups) 
No. Depositors No. Amgul!!_!>f Deposits (O~Q_~FA) N~ 
1. 0 17 1. 0 17 
2. 1 - 2 10 2. 10 to 45 CFA 6 
3. 3 - 9 9 3. 50 to 90 CFA 6 
4. 10 - 17 10 4. 100 to 280 CFA 10 
5. 20 - 30 8 5. 320 to 960 CFA 6 
6. 100 - 150 _ _£ 6. 1,000 to 5,000 CFA 11. 
TOTAL 56 TOTAL 56 56 
c. Occupations 
~ _%_ No. % 
1. Traders 13 23.2 3. Housewives 4 7.1 
2. Farmers 33 58.9 4. Others _J! 10.8 
TOTAL 56 100.0 
D. Gender and Literacy 
No _%_ No. _%_ 
1. Men 50 89.3 1. Literate 27 48.2 
2. Women 6 10.7 2. Illiterate 29 51_.J! 
TOTAL 56 100.0 
E. Term-Structure as Informal Lenders 
No. _%_ No. % 
1. 1-30 Days 15 26.8 4. No Answer 22 39.3 
2. 31-180 Days 5 8.9 5. No Loans 11 _!!!.:J! 
3. 180 Days or More 3 5.4 TOTAL 56 100.0 
F. Term Structure as Depos-!t-Takers 
No. _% __ No. % 
1. 1-30 Days 7 12.5 4. No Deposits 4 7.1 
2. 31-180 Days 22 39.3 5. No Answer 
.!! 25.0 
3. 180 Days or More 9 16.1 TOTAL 56 100.0 
Source: OSU Rural Finance Project Survey Results, 1986, Reported in 
Chapter II I--C in Rural_f_inance in Niger, op. cit. 
• 
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Table 11 
Relevant Characteristics of Moneykeeper Activity Tested by 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates from Niger Village Level Surveys, 1986 
Dependent Variable: Maximum Number of Depositors at the Height of the 
Season (harvest) 
Independent 
yariables 
1. Literacy 
2. Years of service as Moneykeeper 
3. Pawnbroker services 
4. Region 
NJamey 
Dos so 
Tahoua 
Zinder 
5. Occupation 
Traders 
Farmers 
Housewives 
6. Constant 
R2 = 50.0 percent 
Coefficient 
- 12.80 
0.81 
8 .15 
7.59 
1.17 
2.75 
28.09 
22.64 
0.76 
2.69 
17.87 
t-ratio 
- 1.93* 
1.84* 
1.38+ 
- 0.78 
- 0.11 
0.25 
2.65* 
2.01* 
- 0.07 
0.14 
1.09 
* significant at 5% level. For equation specification see note table 
4. 
+ significant at 20% level. 
Source: OSU Rural Finance Project Survey, 1986. 
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Notes 
(1) The documentation and results of these surveys are reported 
in Rural Finance in Niger: A Critical Appraisal and Recom-
mendations for Change, a final report submitted by the Ohio 
State University to the USAID Mission, Niamey, Niger, 
February 1987. 
The research design and implementation was under the 
direction of Douglas Graham, Carlos Cuevas and Kif le Negash 
of Ohio State university and Dr. Michel Keita of the 
Institut de Reserches en Sciences Humaines, Niger. 
Lance Jepson, Ernest Gibson and in particular, Tom Olson 
(our project monitor) of USAID Niamey, offered valuable 
assistance and counsel at critical times during the project. 
Sandra Frydman of the Office of Rural and Institutional 
Development, Bureau of Science and Technology, USAID 
Washington played an instrumental role in launching the 
project through her off ice. Finally Sonda Maina of the 
Ministry of Rural Development offered valuable camradeship 
and professional counsel in administering our project for 
the government of Niger. 
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